The details of this negotiated settlement had been hammered out during the course of secret meetings between Venezuela, the EPA, the Energy Department, and the office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 5 Congress and the public learned of the compromise after the leaking of a confidential cable from Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela. 6 Shortly thereafter, Congress forced the EPA to abandon the deal by inserting a rider in a subsequent EPA appropriations bill that precluded the rule change.7
After the EPA abandoned the rule change, Venezuela relodged its complaint, this time before a dispute-settlement panel of the World Trade Organization (WTO).s The United States has had a difficult time defending its policy under the rules of the GATT.9
The policy would reduce pollution in the United States, 10 but it clearly would discriminate against foreign producers. The United Pub. L. No. 103-327, 108 Stat. 2298 , 2319 (1994 . One administration official, however, contended that, given the largely negative comments received, the proposed rule change might not have been adopted even without the congressional action to block it. See U.S. Defends Gas Rules in WTO Against Charges of Discrimination, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 7, 1995, at 9 [hereinafter U.S. Defends Gas Rules]. The official characterized the proposed rule change as "a limited attempt by EPA to determine whether there was a better solution." Id. 8. Venezuela originally filed its complaint with the dispute-settlement mechanism of the GATT. However, it withdrew the complaint from the GATT mechanism and relodged it on January 20, 1995, with the newly established dispute-settlement mechanism of the WTO.
This was the first case brought against the United States in the WTO. See Venezuela Moves Toward WTO Case in Reformulated Gas Dispute, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 3, 1995, at 4 . For an explanation of the WTO and its dispute-settlement proceedings, see infra Part I.
9. At the time this Note went to press, a WTO dispute-settlement panel had ruled against the United States. See Kantor Says He's Inclined to Appeal Panel's Ruling in Venezuela Gas Case, [13 Current Reports] Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 100 (Jan. 24, 1996) . United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor stated that he intended to appeal the ruling but would consider the views of Congress before making a final decision. Venezuela argued that the EPA's rule discriminates against foreign refineries and violates, among others, Articles I (mostfavorite-nation principle) and III (national-treatment principle) of the GATT. See U.S. Defends Gas Rules, supra note 7, at 8. Countering that allegation, the United States contended that the EPA rule, though facially discriminatory, did not discriminate in practice. By contrast, when it defended the ill-fated bargain with Venezuela to settle out of court, the United States expressed the view that the final EPA rule probably was incompatible with provisions of the GATT. Ira Shapiro, General Counsel for the U.S. Trade Representative, testified before Congress that the United States would have a difficult time defending its policy as compatible with the GATT. He stated that the burden would be on the United States to show that the discrimination is necessary, a difficult task given that the EPA has said that discrimination is not necessary within the meaning of the GATT Article XX to achieve the objectives of the Clean Air Act. See Venezuela Vows GATT Challenge Following House Vote on Gas Rules, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 16, 1994, at 6 . On the exception contained within Article XX of the GATT and the burden of proof to meet the definition of "necessary" within the meaning of that provision, see infra notes 36-37.
10. See supra note 3.
States must prove that this discrimination is necessary -not in the view of U.S. regulators but under the terms of the GAIT -to promote environmental protection. 11 The dispute with Venezuela -referred to as the "Reformulated Gasoline Case" -is just one in a series of conflicts between environmental protection and free trade arising in the context of the world's multilateral trade regime, first under the GAIT and now under the WT0. 12 But the Reformulated Gasoline Case also exemplifies two broad consequences that global interdependence has had for the U.S. government. First, fewer matters of policy can be determined solely by reference to domestic preferences. An increasing range of national policies derives not from internal government but from government's interaction with foreign powers. This interaction leads to the second consequence of global interdependence -a change in the nature of government. Domestic policymaking traditionally has been shared among the three branches and opened to public scrutiny, while the government of foreign affairs has tended to be concentrated in the Executive Branch 13 and conducted in secrecy.1 4 With the rise in global interdependence, matters of domestic government and foreign affairs overlap, and the domestic mode of government tends to give way to that of foreign affairs.
As the Reformulated Gasoline Case suggests, this encroachment threatens the democratic integrity of our domestic policy. It well may be that national rules often fail to reflect the legitimate concerns of foreign powers. This Note proceeds on the premise, however, that it would be against the public interest for executivebranch agencies to seek to accommodate those concerns by negotiating with foreign powers in utter secrecy without engaging in some 11 . On what discrimination is exempted under GA'IT Article XX from the GA'IT's general ban on discriminatory treatment on grounds of "necessity," see infra notes 36-37.
12 117-49 (1990) (describing the gradual monopolization of the nation's foreign policy by the Executive Branch through a combination of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance).
14. Laws promoting open government typically provide some sort of exemption when foreign affairs are concerned. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994) (allowing the President to declare by executive order the parameters of a broad national-security exemption that agency officials may invoke when information is requested under the Freedom of Information Act); 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(l) (1994) (exempting administrative rulemaking from the publicnotice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when a "foreign affairs function of the United States" is involved); Federal Advisory Committee Act, § 10, 86 Stat 770, 774 , reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1375 (1994) (allowing the President or agency head to take exception to the Federal Advisory Committee Act's provisions relating to open meetings, public notice, public participation, and public availability of documents when necessary in the interests of foreign policy).
[ Vol. 94:1267 form of systematic consultation with the range of domestic parties concerned.15 Although the denouement of the Reformulated Gasoline Case appears as something of a triumph for popular sovereignty and open government, the forces that halted the rule change in that case do not operate consistently. Concern for environmental protection will not always comport with the interests of the U.S. oil industry, and thus congressional opposition will not always rise to the level it did in the Reformulated Gasoline Case. 1 6 In the absence of a highprofile concern, Congress rarely will interfere with executivebranch rulemaking, and therefore the administrative agency responsible for a particular issue will control the development of policy. This is troubling because the general requirements ensuring public participation in agency rulemaking currently do not apply when that rulemaking is pursuant to an international agreement.17 Given the rise in global interdependence, this foreign-affairs exception could result in a steady erosion of direct democratic control over domestic regulatory policies that conflict with free-trade rules.
This Note argues that, because the Executive Branch increasingly will be promulgating domestic regulatory rules intended to comply with the rules of the world-trading system, it is necessary to increase formal oversight of the Executive Branch's role in that context. Part I argues that the United States' participation in the WTO implies a substantial increase in the impact of foreign policy on domestic policy. Part II points out a loophole in Congress's attempt to compensate for this increase by installing various devices to ensure political oversight of the Executive: the Executive Branch is subject, under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), 18 to formal oversight during the WTO dispute-settlement process only in connection with adjudicated settlements, not in connection with negotiated settlements. Part III proposes that Congress expand the application of provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 that currently require the U.S. Trade Representative to consult pri- GLOBAL TRADE 103, 116-19 (1995) (arguing that public participation in trade negotiations would serve to check the power of government officials and better inform their decisions).
16. Citgo, a Venezuelan refinery that currently commands five percent of the U.S. market in reformulated gasoline, would have been largely excluded from the U.S. market for three years, to the benefit of the Mobil and Sun oil companies. See Lavelle, supra note 3, at Bl.
17. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(l) (1994) (exempting rulemaking from the public-notice-andcomment requirements of the APA "to the extent that there is involved ... [a] foreign affairs function of the United States"). As currently interpreted, the APA's foreign-affairs excep· tion applies, among others, when agencies issue, modify, or rescind rules in order to implement an international agreement See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Peila, 17 F.3d 1478 , 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1994 ) (holding that a rule modification pursuant to a mutual understanding with Mexico was within the foreign-affairs exception of § 553).
18. This Part argues that the expanding scope of law issued under the auspices of the WTO is cause for concern because the disputesettlement process may fail to consider the full range of national interests in the domestic government policies it affects. Section I.A describes the potentially vast scope of international trade law and how it can spill over into traditional domestic policy areas. Section I.B asserts that the WTO's dispute-settlement process, which determines the concrete impact of international trade law on domestic law, is biased in a way that threatens the integrity of domestic policy.
A. The Expanding Scope of International Trade Law
The range of issues affected by international trade law has expanded greatly for three reasons. First, in recent years, the international trade regime has sought to broaden the scope of trade-related issues that are regulated. Originally, that regime was based on the founding GATI treaty, which only sought to alleviate restrictions on trade in goods. 19 With the completion of the last round of multilateral trade negotiations, the general scope of the WTO's regime has broadened to include the trade in services. 20 The treaty on services creates a framework within which WTO members may commit to open their markets in the service sectors of their choice and to the degree that they specify. The second cause for the expanding impact of international trade law is the increased rigor of the regime. International trade law is now far less tolerant of measures that, though not designed to regulate trade, nonetheless impede it -so-called nontariff barriers. Initially, the international trade regime was concerned mainly with altering or eliminating national laws whose sole purpose was to regulate trade, such as the laws setting tariff rates and restricting imports and exports through the use of quotas. Recently, however, as a consequence of international trade law's increased attention to nontariff barriers, few regulatory fields have escaped the reach of the international trade regime.
Naturally, the more vigorously the architects of the international regime have sought to free trade from the various national regulations that hamper it, the more their efforts have tended to impinge on the designs of other regulators. Conflict with the regulation of environmental law has been most controversial, 22 but health-and-safety rules also have been affected. Third, the reach of trade law is often expanded, not through specific treaty language, but rather through a case-specific application of broad treaty prohibitions. For example, the WTO's general prohibition against discrimination in trade can lead to far-reaching consequences similar to those resulting from the expansive interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause and Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome. 25 Though the adjudicators of a WTO dispute are not at liberty to employ the broad constitutional methods of interpretation applied to the U.S. Constitution and the Treaty of Rome, even more conservative modes of interpretation leave the WTO adjudicative process with a central role in expanding the horizons of WTO law.
The GATT ruling in the Thai Cigarettes case has advanced a potentially far-reaching formula for the scope of Article XX's exception to the general ban on discrimination, which allows discrimination if it is "necessary" to protect public interests such as health and the environment. The panel stated:
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with other GAIT provisions as "necessary" ... if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with other GAIT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GAIT provisions.26 Under this formula, though it is the prerogative of national regulators to set levels of health and environmental protection, they must achieve these levels by the least-trade-restrictive means -and it is the panel that makes this determination. 27 tolerance comports with the statutory standard of public health protection because EPA did not conduct its health assessment at the level of the proposed tolerance").
25. 27. The language of the Thai Cigarettes case is strikingly s_imilar to that employed by the European Court of Justice in limiting the scope of Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome, which is analogous to GATT Article XX. According to the Court of Justice, under Article 36, publichealth "measures are justified only if it is established that they are necessary in order to attain the objective of protection referred to in Article 36 and that such protection cannot be achieved by means which place less of a restriction on the free movement of goods within the Community." Case 155/82, Commission v. Belgium, 3 E.C.R. 531, 543 (1983) . For the general trend in the findings of GATT panels, see 1 Worun TRADE ORO., GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE: ANALYTICAL INDEX 151-55 (1994) (noting that GATT panels consistently have expanded the scope of the national-treatment clause's ban on discrimination against foreign products, extending the notion of discrimination beyond facial discrimination [Vol. 94:1267 .
B. The Role of the Dispute-Settlement Process
As the preceding discussion suggests, the degree to which freetrade commitments affect other domestic policies is determined in great part by the dispute-settlement process of the WTO. This process is governed by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). 28 Under the DSU, parties first must try to settle their dispute by negotiating. 2 9 If they fail to resolve the dispute within sixty days, the complaining party may choose to submit the dispute to adjudication by a panel of experts. 30
When dispute settlement results in a negotiated settlement, the impact of WTO law on nontrade areas of policy is potentially greater than it is when disputes are adjudicated.3 1 As the Reformulated Gasoline Case illustrates, countries whose laws allegedly violate WTO law may have strategic reasons to settle even if they believe they may win an adjudicated case.3 2 Although the WTO provides a safeguard against negotiated settlements that undermine free trade,3 3 no similar safeguard exists to protect against the pressure, inherent in the give and take of trade disputes, to dismantle domestic laws in an effort to reach an agreement.34 to a notion of de facto discrimination including "unequal competitive opportunities"). The 31. In the case of negotiated settlements, the source of legal obligation is not WfO law but rather the general international law commitment created by the agreement between the settling parties. To give rise to an international law obligation, the agreement need not be 32. For example, in the Reformulated Gasoline Case, see supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text, the EPA noted that the terms of its settlement involved changing its rule with regard to reformulated gasoline only, whereas it felt the alternative of adjudication might lead to a finding that the EPA rule provisions on regular gasoline would have to be altered also. See EPA Announces, supra note 1, at 504.
33. The terms of negotiated settlements must be reported to the WTO. See Dispute Set· tlement Understanding, supra note 28, art. 3(6), 33 I.L.M. at 1227. A requirement that these terms be consistent with WTO law, see id. art. 3(5), 33 I.L.M. at 1227, ensures that parties will not undermine the trade regime by settling on terms that are more trade-restrictive than those that would be imposed through adjudication.
34. Naturally, no DSU provision prohibits settlements that undermine nontrade rules more than the trade regime requires. But the dynamics of negotiated settlements may create this result. The synergy between the hormone and procymidone disputes exemplifies the In addition to generating far-reaching effects on domestic policy, the dispute-settlement process naturally produces results that favor free trade over other public-policy concerns.3s Although WTO rules contain exceptions designed to prevent undue encroachment on national governments, efforts to pursue legitimate nontrade policies, 3 6 these exceptions require the country whose rule is at issue to prove its nondiscriminatory basis -a difficult burden.37
Moreover, the international law that is designed to promote interests other than free trade fails to offset the impact of international trade law. No worldwide mechanism approaching the level of efficacy of the WTO enforces countervailing international norms,38 and WTO law does not incorporate them by reference. 3 9 pressures that the free-trade rules may exert on domestic laws outside of any formal adjudication. The desire of the United States to press cases such as the one against the European Union ban on hormones in beef production created pressure on the EPA to establish hastily procymidone-tolerance levels since any appearance of protectionism on the part of the trade rules -developed at a time when international economic matters were not associated with health and environmental considerations -fail to account for environmental externalities and thwart needed domestic legislation, as well as unilateral efforts to force higher environmental standards worldwide). 36. When a national provision is found to discriminate against or among foreign goods, that provision may be justified as "necessary" under GATI Article XX, which states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con- [Vol. 94:1267 Thus, when international law prevails over national law, the worldtrading system, unimpaired by other international forces or its own terms, may run roughshod over the many policies it affects but is not designed to promote.
II. THE LOOPHOLE IN CONGRESS'S ATIEMPT To CONTROL THE
IMPACT OF THE WORLD-TRADING SYSTEM ON DOMESTIC POLICY
Concerns over the impact of the world-trading system on domestic policy pervaded the congressional debates over U.S. accession to the WT0. 40 In the statute implementing the WTO, the URAA, Congress established a scheme designed to assert political control over the United States' interaction with the WT0. 41 Section II.A points out that the URAA's provisions enable Congress to control the Executive Branch's role in settling trade disputes through adjudication but fail to control the Executive when it negotiates settlements as an alternative to adjudication. Section II.B asserts that this loophole is of particular concern in cases when the Executive Branch negotiates settlements it can implement on its own authority.
A. URAA Inapplicability to Negotiated Settlements
The URAA contains elaborate provisions to control the Executive Branch when it represents the United States in disputesettlement proceedings before the WT0. 42 The URAA establishes information and consultation requirements designed to keep Congress, various quasi-representative bodies, and the public informed about the Executive Branch's participation in WTO activities. One. set of provisions is designed to give the general public access to information about adjudicative proceedings by requiring that they be as transparent as possible within the constraints of WTO rules. 43 other's GATI obligations, allowing them to apply standards prescribed in certain specified international environmental agreements though this otherwise would result in a GATI violation). 103-465, § 126, 108 Stat 4809, 4834 (1994) . The USTR must give notice of the existence of panel proceedings and the issues involved. When the United States or its adversary in a dispute requests that the case be brought before a panel, the USTR must Another set of URAA provisions establishes procedures designed to subject the Executive Branch's interaction with the WTO during adjudication to oversight 44 by congressional committees and quasirepresentative bodies. 45 A third set of provisions applies similar oversight provisions to the regulatory implementation of WTO rulings. 46 Extensive though they are, none of the URAA's oversight and transparency provisions applies to negotiated settlements because those provisions apply only after a complainant requests that a dispute be brought before a panel. 47 Stat. 4809, 4831 (1994) . Also, the submissions of the parties and the findings of the panel must be made available to the public to the extent disclosure is permitted by WTO rules. The USTR's written submissions must be made available to the public promptly after they are presented to the panel. As to other parties' submissions, the USTR must request each other party to allow the USTR to make them available to the public. If permission is refused, then the USTR must request the nonconfidential summary that parties to a Stat. 4809, 4816 (1994) . Thus, these provisions do not ensure democratic control in the manner of the provisions applying to adjudicated settlements.
given that many disputes are likely to end in a negotiated settlement before either party requests a panel hearing. 4 s Congress's failure to cover negotiated settlements under the URAA is difficult to justify. As noted in Part I, the impact of WTO law on U.S. domestic law is potentially even greater when it results from negotiated, as opposed to adjudicated, settlements.49 The difference in treatment of negotiated and adjudicated settlements may derive some justification from the fact that Congress is more likely to refuse to implement a negotiated settlement than an adjudicated settlement. Even though both WTO adjudicative rulings and negotiated settlements create international law obligations, a WTO ruling is likely to carry greater moral force than a negotiated settlement. 50 Thus, in the case of negotiated settlements, Congress may be more inclined to implement a negotiated settlement, acting as a democratic buffer between the international process and its impact on domestic law. Congress's inclination to refuse to implement settlements, however, will always be tempered by concern for the United States' credibility in future negotiations, and this concern often will stand in the way of Congress's ability to act as a democratic buffer.
B. Executive-Implemented Settlements
Though this discussion thus far has assumed that implementing a negotiated settlement would require the intervention of Congress, those settlements calling for regulatory -rather than statutorychanges would not require congressional intervention. The Reformulated Gasoline Case discussed in the Introduction is a good example. This section argues that the current law offers virtually no democratic control over the Executive Branch when it negotiates settlements and implements them using its regulatory authority. Section II.B.1 notes that congressional control is insubstantial, and 48. If a silent legislative history is any indication, Congress did not consider the discrepancy between its treatment of adjudicated and negotiated settlements. See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 656, 656-57 (1994) 
A Near Absence of Congressional Control
Congress can control executive regulatory action by using the power of the purse or passing a law to reverse a particular line of regulatory conduct. But there are two factors militating against congressional control by such means. First, concern for the credibility of the United States as a contracting party weighs against reversing a policy the Executive Branch has developed in conjunction with a trading partner. Second, Congress's role in this context depends on its willingness to intervene actively. This is quite different from its role when a settlement requires statutory changes. In the latter case, Congress can control the impact of WTO law merely by refusing to modify laws to comply with the agreement. Congressional control over the WTO's impact on regulatory policy, on the other hand, supposes aggressive congressional intervention in fields where Congress has abandoned day-to-day control. This occurred in the Reformulated Gasoline Case. But few would expect Congress to intervene every time international negotiations led to rule changes. Indeed, many regulatory issues will simply escape the attention of Congress.
The Inadequacy of the Normal Alternatives to Congressional Control
Administrative law provides other procedures for ensuring the democratic integrity of the rules it produces, precisely because most regulatory activity will not draw the attention of Congress. Agencies normally create, modify, or rescind rules following procedures guaranteeing public participation, which are set out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 51 These procedures generally involve a period of public notice and comment. 52 Agencies, however, may dispense with those procedures under a foreign-affairs exception applicable when rulemaking is pursuant to an international agreement.53 [ Vol. 94:1267 Even if an agency waives the foreign-affairs exception to the APA, 54 the international negotiations giving rise to the rule change will tend to undermine the significance of the public-notice-andcomment process. Before submitting the necessary rule changes to public notice and comment, the agency must have reached at least a tentative agreement with another country. 55 At this point, the agency has a number of incentives to ignore legitimate domestic interests unless they can be accommodated without altering the terms of the tentative agreement. First, the agency and the foreign power often will have expended great efforts to reach a delicately balanced solution, and thus the parties naturally will be disinclined to return to the negotiating table to work out a new solution. Second, the agency generally will prefer to implement an agreement as negotiated to avoid losing credibility in future negotiations. The fact that the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) always leads U.S. negotiating teams56 in trade matters makes the concern about future negotiating clout even more pressing. Third, the leading role of the USTR creates an institutional bias in favor of promoting free trade and against concerns specific to the domestic regulatory field involved that militate in favor of renegotiating.
III. CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE
The erosion of democracy resulting from the Executive Branch's dual role as advocate for the United States in WTO negotiated settlements and domestic lawmaker presents a dilemma. International negotiations require that the United States speak with one voice. The particular context of dispute resolution also often requires secrecy .57 But although secrecy is an effective way to strike a deal in an individual case involving international law, it is an unsatisfactory way to make domestic policy. The challenge is thus to balance the conflicting imperatives of the international and domestic systems in which the Executive Branch simultaneously must operate.
54. Agencies do not always invoke the foreign-affairs exception when issuing rule changes pursuant to an international agreement. One such instance was the EPA's notice for public comment on its final rule implementing the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (1988) .
55. Under an even less ideal scenario, the agency formally might conclude the agreement before submitting the necessary rule changes for public notice and comment. Under these circumstances, the only role of the notice-and-comment process would be to aid the agency in choosing among any regulatory options left open by the agreement.
See 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(l)(C) (1994).
57. If negotiators must work in public, the political concerns of both sides will lead to posturing, thus obstructing the path to a mutually agreeable solution. In the particular instance of negotiated settlements within the WTO, the governing rules require that negotiations be confidential. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
This Part contends that a balanced solution lies in a formal mechanism subjecting the Executive Branch to timely political oversight that allows it to operate independently and, when appropriate, under conditions of secrecy. Section III.A explains the four attributes that such a solution should seek to achieve. Section III.B points out that the URAA's scheme for political oversight of the Executive Branch's role in connection with WTO adjudicated settlements suggests a scheme well-suited to achieve similar oversight of the Executive's role in connection with negotiated settlements. Section III.C proposes enacting such a scheme through two minor amendments. One amendment would alter the Trade Act of 1974 to make advisory committee meetings under that Act mandatory during negotiated settlements. This amendment also would trigger an existing provision of that Act requiring consultations with congressional advisors. Another amendment would alter the DRAA itself and extend its procedures that now only govern agency action pursuant to a WTO adjudicated settlement to agency action pursuant to a negotiated settlement.
A. The Parameters of a Solution
Four general policies should guide a solution in order to accommodate the conflicting exigencies of diplomacy and domestic policymaking: (1) control over the President should result from increased political scrutiny, not binding congressional or judicial control; (2) any means of increasing political scrutiny should accommodate the occasional need for secrecy in international negotiations; (3) political scrutiny should be timely; and (4) it should be ensured through procedural requirements. This section briefly describes the importance of each of these policy goals.
Political Scrutiny
An oversight mechanism should achieve democratic control, not by limiting the ultimate authority of the President, but rather by subjecting the exercise of that authority to political scrutiny. The binding control of Congress is not necessary to achieve policies responsive to the public because, as many advocates of executivebranch preeminence in foreign affairs will point out, the President was elected too. 5 8 Further, sharing power with Congress in this context is not only unnecessary but undesirable. Congressional decisionmaking in the area of international trade leads to the preva-58. An even stronger view has been expressed by Professor Trimble.
[I]t is at least unclear why Congress, especially its Senate half, should be considered more "democratic" than the President. Each institution -House, Senate, Presidenthas its own electoral cycle and its distinctive constituencies. The House is elected more frequently, and thus is presumably more susceptible to the immediate moods of its constituencies. But only the President has the entire people as his constituency.
[Vol. 94:1267 lence of parochial concerns over broader national interests.s9 Judicial control by means of adjudicating private suits seeking review of negotiated settlements almost certainly would engender the undue influence of special interests.60
A Selective Approach to Secrecy
Although negotiations sometimes must take place under conditions of secrecy, the domestic rulemaking process connected with negotiations need not. The WTO's DSU requires the confidentiality of negotiations held within the framework of that Understanding. 61 But domestic rulemaking pursuant to the resolution of a dispute within the WTO need not6 2 and should not6 3 take place outside the normal procedures ensuring public input.
Timing
When regulatory policy is tributary to international agreements, the timing of political scrutiny is crucial. Domestic political forces should weigh in before these agreements are concluded. Once an agreement is in place, those in charge of implementing the agreement are faced with the choice of either ignoring domestic resistance to the policy changes dictated by the agreement or reneging on One of the hallmarks of democracy is accountability. The Haiti experience dramatically demonstrates the accountable, and hence quintessentially democratic, nature of the presidency. The President and his advisers have discussed the Haiti situation in news conferences, radio addresses, press releases and innumerable other interactions with interested constituencies. Most importantly, Haiti seems quite likely to figure in the President's campaign for reelection (as it did in his 1992 campaign).
No member of Congress, on the other hand, has addressed anyone on the congressional position (there really is none). No member of Congress will be asked to account for that institution's votes, or failures to vote, on Haiti. To be sure, a member of Congress may be attacked for a particular vote, or for being too "inside the Beltway" or otherwise identified with Washington, but Congress as a whole is never accountable to any constituency, let alone the American people as a whole.
Id.
59. See l.M. DESTI.ER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 4-8 {1995) (explaining that protectionist interests tend to be concentrated and free-trade interests tend to be diffused and that members of Congress -who must respond to concentrated interests -are thus under great pressure to vote for protectionist policies and asserting that this was a major factor prompt· ing Congress to delegate much trade-policymaking authority to the President, who is better equipped to ignore concentrated interests in favor of the general interest). Although political scrutiny often will occur spontaneously, the force and pervasiveness of the WTO's influence over U.S. policy call for an institutional response to ensure timely, consistent political scrutiny. In the Reformulated Gasoline Case, the EPA did provide opportunity for public notice and comment -after the impending deal with Venezuela was leaked -before closing the deal with Venezuela.6 5 But the EPA and other agencies do not have to submit rulemaking that is pursuant to internationally negotiated agreements to public notice and comment, and they have used this loophole on at least one important occasion.6 6 As argued in Part II, many regulatory changes may not elicit a congressio:Q.al response. Yet public influence over executive policies should not depend on the level of congressional interest. For example, though Congress may not be moved to combat higher-than-optimal tolerance levels for procymidone, 67 the public ought to have some input into the decision whether to pay the price of such a policy for the sake of increasing free trade. If, however, the Executive Branch is permitted to alter trade-related domestic policy by presenting the public with a series of faits accomplis, negotiated settlements are likely steadily to erode nontrade domestic policies. It is not enough to assume that the Executive Branch will react to public disapproval of the general trend in policy. The trend will be too gradual to provoke a sharp reaction. Thus, political scrutiny should operate through some institutional device that puts the spotlight on each incremental step the Executive takes to adapt U.S. rules to the requirements of the international trade regime. 64 . If domestic political forces can weigh in before the conclusion of an agreement, the result is likely to be an agreement more reflective of the interests concerned. In the event that domestic resistance precludes any negotiated settlement, the ensuing adjudication will force only the undesired policy change if this is required by WTO law.
65. See EPA Announces, supra note 1, at 504. 66. On November 21, 1991, the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) entered into a memorandum of understanding with Mexico involving the mutual recognition of commercial drivers' licenses. The FHA later promulgated a rule implementing the agreement, see 51 Fed. Reg. 31,454 (1992) , without, however, following the APA's public-notice-and-comment procedures. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Pefia, 17 F.3d 1478 , 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1994 . For an account of the events surrounding that case, see Goldman, supra note 24, at 653.
67. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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B. The URAA's Formal-Oversight Requirements
The URAA procedures governing adjudicated settlements offer good models for developing procedures to guarantee political control over the President in negotiated settlements. These procedures achieve the policy goals described in the previous section. Section ill.B.1 examines the URAA's use of congressional and privatesector advisory committees to oversee the Executive Branch as it participates in adjudicated settlements. Section III.B.2 examines the URAA procedures governing agency action pursuant to adjudicated settlements.
Political Control During Negotiations
Whenever the United States is a party in WTO adjudicative proceedings, the URAA requires the USTR to consult representative bodies "at each stage of the proceeding [s] ."68 These bodies include "advisory committees," representing a cross-section of the private sector, as well as representatives of state and local governments.69 The USTR also must consult congressional committees according to the same schedule. 1 0 The congressional committees to be con-68. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 127(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4835 (1994) . The URAA contains other provisions, not directly relevant to this Note, that also are designed to assert democratic control over the United States' interaction with the \VfO. Certain provisions designed to give the public access to the adjudicative proceedings before the wro would not be adapted easily to negotiations because the terms of the wro require that dispute-settlement negotiations be confidential. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 28, art. 4(6), 33 I.L.M. at 1229. For an argument in favor of transparency in negotiated settlements under the pre-WTO regime of GATI's dispute-settlement mechanism, see Naomi Robt-Arriaza, Precaution, Participation, and the "Greening" of International Trade Law, 7 J. ENVrL. L. & Lmo. 57, 96-98 (1992) . In addition to the devices designed to ensure political oversight of the President's role of representing the United States in \VfO dispute-settlement proceedings, the URAA contains similar provisions with respect to decisionmaking in the \VfO. These mainly require consulting congressional committees before "any vote is taken by the Ministerial Conference or the General Council" of the \VfO and systematically reporting to Congress on any decisions taken. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 122, 108 Stat. 4809, 4829-30 (1994) . More general requirements involve a yearly report to Congress on participation in the \VfO, see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 124, 108 Stat. 4809, 4832-33 (1994) , and a more general assessment of participation in the \VfO to be submitted to Congress every five years, see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 125, 108 Stat. 4809, 4833-34 (1994 This set of provisions subjects the negotiating process to acute political scrutiny, yet it provides the Executive Branch with sufficient flexibility in negotiations. The Executive Branch is not bound by the advice it receives. 72 The URAA provisions also allow for secrecy when necessary. Although the URAA does not require the confidentiality of communications to the congressional committees, confidentiality can be secured through an injunction of secrecy.1 3 The USTR also may consult the advisory committees confidentially if need be. 7 4 As to timing, by requiring consultation during the proceedings, the URAA enables the congressional and advisory committees to influence the USTR while it is still in a position to affect the course of WTO proceedings, not afterwards.
Political Control Over Agency Regulatory Action
If WTO adjudication results in a finding that a U.S. agency's regulation or practice is inconsistent with WTO law, the DRAA provides for political scrutiny of the Executive Branch's efforts to Stat. 4809, 4831-32 (1994) (permitting the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee to "vote to indicate the[ir] agreement or disagreement" with final rules adopted by agencies pursuant to a panel ruling but specifying that the vote is not binding on the USTR.).
73. For an example of a statute providing for similar confidential communications between the President and Congress, see 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (1994) (requiring that the President transmit to Congress any international agreement, other than a treaty, to which the United States is a party, but that, when disclosure of the agreement would "in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States," the agreement "shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President").
74. This set of provisions unleashes the full range of political scrutiny, calling on, not only the input and influence of congressional and advisory committees, but also public participation. The circumstances of agency rulemaking, as opposed to those of the international negotiating process, allow for this more extensive democratic control. Th.is· is because rulemaking intervenes after WTO adjudicative proceedings have run their course, as the agency takes action to implement the settlement. At that point, there is no need for secrecy.
The existence of a public-notice-and-comment component in the provisions described above indicates that, where the WTO was concerned, Congress felt the need to make an exception to the APA's 75. This requirement is triggered "[i]n any case in which a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body finds in its report that a regulation or practice of a department or agency of the United States is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements." Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g)(l), 108 Stat. 4809, 4831 (1994) .
76. The URAA provides that a regulation may not be changed unless: (A) the appropriate congressional committees have been consulted .
•. (B) the Trade Representative has sought advice ... from relevant private sector committees ..• (C) the head of the relevant department or agency has provided an opportunity for public comment by publishing in the Federal Register the proposed modification and an explanation for the modification; (D) the Trade Representative has submitted to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing the proposed modification, the reasons for the modification, and a summary of the advice obtained [from the advisory committees]. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g)(l), 108 Stat. 4809, 4831 (1994 foreign-affairs exception. 80 Indeed, the DRAA establishes procedures more elaborate than those required by the APA inasmuch as the DRAA requires the consultation of Congress and advisory committees.
C. The Mechanics of a Solution
The preceding URAA provisions merited consideration not only by way of example but also because they suggest the current inclinations of Congress about how to achieve democratic control over the Executive Branch in the context of the WTO. This section suggests some minor reforms that would expand upon the work Congress began with the DRAA in 1994. Section III.C.l proposes amending the Trade Act of 1974 to require advisory committees to convene during the negotiation of settlements. Section III.C.2 proposes amending the URAA itself. This amendment would extend to agency rulemaking pursuant to negotiated settlements the DRAA provisions currently governing agency rulemaking following adjudicated settlements. In combination, these amendments would ensure that important domestic concerns are not ignored in the process of reaching international trade agreements. REv. 267, 352 (1982) . Originally, the advisory committees were to represent "non-Federal governments, labor, industry, agriculture, small business, service industries, retailers, and consumer interests." 19 U.S.C. § 2155(b) (1988) . During the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, however, the public and members of Congress voiced concern that these committees were being dominated by industry. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 673. In response, the DRAA has added "nongovernmental environmental and conservation organizations" to the list of interests to be represented in § 135 advisory committees. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 128, 108 Stat. 4809, 4836 (1994) . Some still argue that advisory committees inadequately represent the range of interests affected by international trade law. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 672-77 (arguing that the membership of advisory committees is made up almost exclusively of representatives of industry, that nonindustry representatives are picked only from the trade-friendly ranks of consumer environmental and labor movements, and that this skewed representation violates the Federal Advisory Committee Act's balancedviewpoint requirement). 82. See 19 U.S.C. § 2155(a)(l)(C) (1994) . Under § 135, the USTR must: seek information and advice from representative elements of the private sector and the non-Federal governmental sector with respect to- [Vol. 94:1267 advisory committees set up to operate under section 135 are the same as those referred to in the URAA, and the same provisions ensuring the confidentiality of consultations apply.83
The timing provision of sectio~ 135 could be improved, however, because it does not require the USTR to convene advisory committees during negotiations. Although section 135 appears to mandate that the USTR consult advisors individually before and during negotiations when feasible, that provision does not impose requirements as to the timing of advisory committee meetings,84 The required timely consultation of advisors on an individual basis is laudable, but a similar requirement as to the timing of advisory committee meetings would improve upon the existing consultation mechanism for a number of reasons. First, a requirement to consult advisors independently amounts only to ensuring that lobbying is more equitable and timely and that the government is better informed. Convening advisors, on the other hand, would create a political forum that intensifies the Executive Branch's accountability for the course of action it chooses. Advisors would hear the concerns other domestic constituencies have expressed and thus see clearly which interests weighed more heavily in the Executive's choices. The proposed system of confidential consultations thus provides a rough surrogate for public scrutiny as a means of ensuring the political accountability of the Executive Branch without compromising secrecy.ss The only court to interpret language similar to the current version of § 135 concluded that the relevant federal agency was not under an obligation to convene advisory committee meetings. See Dabney v. Reagan, 559 F. Supp. 861, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) .
85. Members of consulted bodies may not be permitted to convey all the details of consultations, but they are not prohibited from communicating all aspects of the policies under consideration to the interest groups that they represent. Section 135 provides that rules about information from the public sector should "to the maximum extent feasible permit meaningful consultations by advisory committee members with persons affected by [trade negotiations]." 19 U.S.C. § 2155(g)(3) (1994).
Second, advisory committee meetings in principle are not necessarily confidential, 8 6 so that a selective approach to secrecy may allow public scrutiny of whatever discussion in the meetings can be disclosed without infringing on the secrecy of the international negotiations required under the terms of the WTO DSU.
Third, the requirement to convene committees during negotiations also would enhance political scrutiny of the negotiations by involving not only the advisory committees but Congress as well. Section 135 requires that "in the course of consultations with the Congress ... information provided by advisory committees shall be made available to congressional advisers." 87 Nego~iated settlements would trigger this requirement to inform congressional advisors because section 2211 of title 19 of the U.S. Code mandates consultations with Congress concerning "the resolution of trade disputes. "88 Congress can remedy the shortcoming in the timing of advisory committee meetings by requiring committees to meet "at the call of the USTR and, when the USTR is negotiating with a view toward resolving a dispute susceptible of adjudication under the WTO DSU, during those negotiations." This adjustment would align, when WTO dispute resolution is concerned, the role of advisory committees in negotiated settlements under the Trade Act of 1974 with the role Congress assigned these same committees regarding adjudicated settlements under the URAA, which requires advisory committees to meet "at each stage" of adjudicative proceedings. 89 Such a formal requirement to convene advisory committees might seem an excessive burden to place on the USTR, but current URAA provisions already impose most of this burden. 9° First, though convening during negotiations will require many more committee meetings, the USTR must make the necessary adjustments in any case to accommodate the current URAA provisions requiring consultations during each stage of WTO adjudicative proceed-86. Infonnation submitted to advisory committees may be disclosed according to rules promulgated by the USTR. See 5 U.S.C. § 2155(g)(3) (1994) . Also, advisory committee meetings are not necessarily closed to the public. Public-interest groups have sued to compel the USTR to rescind a blanket-closure order making all advisory committee meetings confidential. See Public Citizen v. Kantor, No. 94-2236 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 17, 1994 Stat. 4809, 4835 (1994) .
90. Whatever the practical considerations, the requirement to seek advice from and consult advisory committees does not appear to raise separation-of-powers issues. See Bybee, supra note 69, at 55 (contrasting statutory requirements of consultation with unconstitutional statutory restrictions of consultation). (Vol. 94:1267 ings.9 1 Second, under current DRAA provisions, the USTR must consult representatives of state governments during negotiations.92 Those provisions require the USTR to give notice to government officials of concerned states that a foreign power has opened the WTO's pre-adjudicative negotiation process. Notice must be served within seven days of the opening of those WTO procedures.93 Within thirty days of that opening, the USTR must "consult with representatives of the State concerned regarding the matter."9 4 When the international negotiations involve the laws of a number of states, the USTR "may consult with an appropriate group of representatives of the states concerned, as determined by those States. " 95 This means that the USTR will have to entertain the possibly divergent views of an ad hoc group of states.96 Advisory committees, on the other hand, are standing bodies, requiring considerably less effort to convene.
Thus, in light of these two current requirements of the URAA, the proposed additional requirement to convene advisory committees would appear to impose little cost, which, given the importance of WTO negotiated settlements,97 is well worth the gains that advisory committees would offer.
Extending the URAA Provisions Applicable to Adjudicated Settlements to Negotiated Settlements
Congress should amend the URAA to extend to rulemaking pursuant to negotiated settlements the procedures currently applicable to rulemaking pursuant to WTO adjudicative rulings. 98 This section proposes a way to accomplish this objective: amending sec- 4809, 4816 (1994) .
96. Also, the USTR first will have to go through the exercise of determining what state laws are likely to be affected. On the other hand, consulting advisory committees would occur under far more routine and convenient conditions. The USTR would consult advisory committees without having to discuss separately with each committee member and without having to go through the exercise of determining which state laws were affected. would propose rule changes on the basis of a draft settlement. This would allow some possibility of influencing the content of the final agreement, rather than just influencing whatever choices the terms of the agreement happen to leave open.
Third, the public nature of the rulemaking procedures proposed in this section would reinforce the efficacy of the consultations that occur during negotiations. During negotiations, the Executive is more likely to give appropriate weight to the views of its critics on the advisory committees if U.S. negotiators know that they will have to face the "constituencies" of those critics in an ensuing public debate.
Finally, the procedures prescribed to oversee rulemaking go beyond the public-notice-and-comment provisions that normally would apply under the APA absent agency invocation of the foreign-affairs exception. 1 02 The rulemaking procedures of the URAA that this section proposes to extend to rulemaking pursuant to negotiated settlements require the agency to submit rule changes to advisory10 3 and congressional committees.104 In particular, the procedures allow congressional committees to cast a nonbinding vote against the proposed rule.10 5 Such a vote, if negative, often may be enough to send the negotiating agency back to the bargaining table to obtain a settlement more consonant with domestic political sentiment.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of drawing attention to the influence of negotiated settlements on the formulation of domestic rules is not to protest the institutionalized influence of the world-trading system upon domestic policy. In a world characterized by an increasingly global economy, some loss of sovereignty is inevitable. In an era when one nation's choices increasingly affect the welfare of others, the United States has done well to participate in institutions that formalize the ability of nations to influence each other's policies. The trick, however, is to relinquish sovereignty without compromising Act, § 123(f)(2), 108 Stat. 4809, 4831 (1994) . This requirement regard· ing adjudicated settlements and the one proposed here regarding negotiated settlements are roughly analogous in that both promote the same general concern to impose political scrutiny before the writ of international law becomes final.
102 democracy. As has been suggested in this Note, the United States could improve in this regard, particularly when negotiated settlements require regulatory changes. By allowing executive-branch agencies to make rule changes in the course of clandestine negotiations, the United States' current foreign-affairs regime fails to ensure democratic participation and accountability in the administrative state. The statutory amendments proposed in this Note accommodate the exigencies of diplomacy without foresaking direct public influence on domestic pop.cy.
